“Function and Concept” (German: Über Funktion und Begriff, “On Function and Concept”) is an article by Gottlob Frege, published in The article involves a . : Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung (): Gottlob Frege: Books. Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung. [Gottlob Frege] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Mit den hier von Günther Patzig zusammengestellten und.
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It is easy to define the relation of membership of a set or extension in Frege’s system; Russell then drew attention to “the set of things x that are such that x is not a member of x “. In this paper, Frege considered two puzzles about language and noticed, in each case, that one cannot account for the meaningfulness or logical behavior of funktkon sentences simply on the basis of the denotations of the terms names and descriptions in the sentence.
Frege’s Philosophy of Language While pursuing his investigations into mathematics and logic and quite possibly, in order to ground those investigationsFrege was led to develop a philosophy of language.
Abbe was more than a teacher to Frege: We can do without the notation introduced by this sentence, and hence without the sentence itself as its definition; nothing follows from the sentence that could not begritf be inferred without it.
The article involves a clarification of his earlier distinction between concepts and objects. But now what about the concept extension which is not an element of itself? Notice that if concepts P and Q are both concepts which satisfy one of these conditions, then there is a one-to-one correspondence between the objects which fall under P and the objects which fall under Q.
His Begriffsschrifteine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens [ Concept-Script: Harvard University Press, pp. The MIT Press, 3— In essence, he defined a proof to be any begrifd sequence of statements such that each statement in the sequence either is an axiom or follows from previous members by a valid rule of inference.
Essays on the Philosophical and Foundational Work of G. We now work toward a theoretical description of the denotation of the sentence as a whole.
Thus, the number 2 falls under the concept that which when squared is identical to 4. Johannes Stellwagen marked it as to-read Dec 20, Frege had friendly relations with Jews in real life: In other projects Wikimedia Commons Wikiquote Wikisource.
Acknowledgments I would like to thank Kai Wehmeier, whose careful eye as a logician and Frege scholar caught several passages where I had bent the truth past the breaking point.
The rules governing the inferences between statements with different but related subject terms are different from the rules governing the inferences funition statements with different but related verb complements.
Hanskoebi marked it as to-read Nov 22, Frege tells us that a first-level concept is a one-place function that correlates objects with truth-values This sounds circular, since it looks like we have analyzed There are two authors of Principia Mathematicawhich involves the concept two funktuon, as The concept being an author of Principia Mathematica falls under the concept being a concept under which two objects fallwhich also involves the concept two.
Let us refer to the denotation and sense of the words as follows: Winnington-Ingram – – The Classical Review 7 Philosophers today still find that work insightful. This principle seems to capture the idea that if we say something true about an object, then even if we change the name by which we refer to that object, we should still be saying something true about that object.
For example, he criticized mathematicians who defined a variable to be a beriff that varies rather than an expression of language which can vary as to which determinate number it may take as a value.
In general, then, the Principle of Identity Substitution seems to take the following form, where S is a sentence, n and m are names, and S n differs from S m only by the fact that at least one occurrence of m replaces n:.
MacFarlane addresses this question, and points out that their conceptions differ in various ways:. Oxford University Press, 97— Translated as Concept Script, a formal language of pure thought modelled upon that of arithmeticby S. The latter consisted of a set of logical axioms statements considered to be truths of logic and a set of rules of inference that lay out the conditions under which certain statements of the language may be correctly inferred from others.
Frege developed the theory of sense and denotation into a thoroughgoing philosophy of language. The elements of all geometrical constructions are intuitions, and geometry refers to intuition as the source of its axioms. These are essentially the definitions that logicians still use today. Frege’s Philosophy of Language 3.
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung: Fünf Logische Studien by Gottlob Frege
One puzzle concerned identity statements and the other concerned sentences with subordinate clauses such as propositional attitude reports. Harvard University Press, Philosophy of LanguageLondon: Dietmar marked it as to-read Aug 12, To see the intuitive idea behind this definition, consider how the definition is satisfied in the case of the number 1 preceding the number 2: Frege then demonstrated that one could use his system to resolve theoretical mathematical statements in terms of simpler logical and mathematical notions.
Frege studied at a gymnasium in Wismar and graduated in Many of the philosophical doctrines of the mature Frege have parallels in Lotze; it has been the subject of scholarly debate whether or not there was a direct influence on Frege’s views arising from his attending Lotze’s lectures.
Frege’s two systems are best characterized as term logics, since all of the complete expressions are denoting terms. To see the problem posed by the analysis of propositional attitude reports, consider what appears to be a simple principle of reasoning, namely, the Principle of Identity Substitution this is not to be confused with the Rule of Substitution discussed earlier.
Immediately after submitting this thesis, the good offices of Abbe led Frege to become a Privatdozent Lecturer at the University of Jena. Note the last line. Books by Gottlob Frege. This explains why the Principle of Identity Substitution fails for terms following the propositional attitude verbs in propositional attitude reports.
In Aristotelian logic, these inferences have nothing in common.